Un método Cubano para lograr conectividad a internet

(Versión Inglés)

La infraestructura doméstica de conexión a internet en Cuba es una de las peores del mundo, y sus posibilidades de mejoría son ínfimas a causa del embargo de E.U, las políticas de control de acceso y de limitaciones al acceso, el poder de ETECSA, la falta de una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados y en alta demanda, y la falta de capital. ¿Podría eliminarse de alguna manera estos obstáculos?

El embargo va a ser derogado eventualmente, y hay signos de que podría ser relativamente pronto. Mientras tanto, China y otros países están dispuestos a vender y negociar con Cuba.

Las políticas de control gubernamentales podrían cambiar. Cuando Cuba se unió a internet por primera vez, hubo un debate de alto nivel sobre “el dilema del dictador” - la percepción de internet como una amenaza política y cultural contra su potencial de mejorar la vida de las personas y la economía. Se tomó entonces la decisión de controlar internet y el acceso al mismo - pero esta situación no está tallada en piedra, podría revertirse.

¿Y sobre ETECSA? ¿Existe acaso alguna nación en la que el proveedor de telecomunicaciones (sea propiedad del gobierno o privado) no actúe en interés propio a detrimento de la población y la economía? Sospecho que la respuesta es “no”. No conozco a la administración actual de ETECSA, pero me sorprendería que fuera diferente al resto.

ETECSA pertenece conjuntamente al Ministerio de Informática y Comunicaciones y a la empresa RAFIN, SA. El Ministerio lógicamente es parte del gobierno y se somete a su voluntad política -pero las políticas y los líderes pueden cambiar-.

RAFIN es un asunto diferente. No sé cuál es su rol en la administración de ETECSA. Ni siquiera comprendo el rol de una S.A en una nación socialista. ¿Dónde obtuvieron el capital para comprar la parte de ETECSA que pertenecía a Telecom Italia? ¿Quiénes son los accionistas e inversores? ¿Comparten ellos las ganancias y pérdidas de ETECSA? ¿Obtienen un puesto en el consejo de administración -una voz en las decisiones ejecutivas y de políticas a aplicar-? Necesito ayuda de un economista en esta parte.

Una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados llegará una vez que la conectividad sea útil, globalmente disponible, y abordable -llegara como consecuencia, no como requerimiento, para una internet moderna-.

Nos queda entonces la falta de capital. China jugó un papel activo en el financiamiento e instalación del cable submarino ALBA-1, y en ese entonces especulé que a lo mejor harian una inversión en la infraestructura doméstica, pero esto hasta el momento no ha sucedido.

La sabiduría convencional del Banco Mundial o de la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones es que el camino para lograr el capital necesario para la conectividad es privatizar la industria de las telecomunicaciones y de los proveedores de servicios de internet (ISP), e invitar entonces a inversores extranjeros a construir la infraestructura y competir hasta cierto nivel mientras son controlados por una agencia reguladora – Privatización, Regulación y Competencia (PCR).

Raúl Castro anunció que el gobierno está trabajando en una nueva política de inversión extranjera, lo cual es de singular importancia para estimular el desarrollo económico y social del país. La ley se espera que esté aprobada en Marzo próximo. Falta ver si la nueva ley y la supuesta demanda atraerá o no a inversionistas mayores, pero incluso si sucediera, hay un problema con la estrategia PCR – no funciona bien.

Muchas naciones en desarrollo optaron por la estrategia PCR entre 1991 y 2008:

En el año 2009, observé los datos y concluí que "PCR tuvo un impacto pequeño sobre Internet durante los últimos diez años en naciones desarrolladas o en desarrollo." No he actualizado el artículo con datos consecutivos, pero nuestra experiencia en E.U muestra que la propiedad privada sobre los servicios de telecomunicaciones no garantiza la competencia, la eficiencia y el buen servicio, a pesar de las buenas intenciones de los reguladores y del congreso.

Necesitamos una solución Cubana.

Seria genial si Cuba pudiera permitirse comprar una infraestructura moderna de telecomunicaciones, con fibra óptica hasta las edificaciones y retroalimentación (backhaul) para comunicaciones móviles LTE (siglas en inglés para “evolución a largo plazo”), pero no puede, por lo que tenemos que pensar en soluciones a corto plazo más baratas. El resto de este artículo lo dedicaremos a especular sobre una posibilidad, una política descentralizada multi-satelital.

Varios años atrás, escribí dos artículos (aquí y aquí) abordando las tecnologías inalámbricas para la conectividad en países en desarrollo: plataformas enlazadas y no enlazadas de altitud elevada (HAPs), redes inalámbricas terrestres (WiMAX era esperanzadora en aquel entonces), constelaciones de satélites de órbita baja (LEO) y terminales de satélite de apertura muy pequeña (VSATs).

Google experimenta actualmente con HAPs, pero sin ninguna utilización significativa. Hasta donde conozco, nadie está estudiando los satélites LEO y WiMAX no se desarrolló como se había previsto. En la época en que se escribieron esos artículos, VSAT era la única opción para conectar áreas rurales en naciones como la India, pero las estaciones terrestres VSAT eran grandes, caras y lentas.

Desde aquel entonces, la tecnología ha progresado, y el mercado de consumidores para la conexión por satélite ha crecido. Proveedores estadounidenses como HughesNet y Viasat tienen 1 398 000 suscriptores entre los dos. A pesar de los largos tiempos de respuesta, he tenido video-conferencias fluidas con amigos que usan platos satelitales en zonas rurales de Brasil y Chile. Las antenas son pequeñas, los costos bajan, y la velocidad crece.

¿Qué pasaría si el gobierno cubano fomentara el uso de los satélites en lugar de prohibirlos?

El gobierno de Cuba ha dicho que autorizará agentes para la venta de tiempo de teléfono e internet. ¿Que pasaria si expandieran el programa para permitir a esos agentes a poseer y vender tiempo y servicios usando enlaces de internet por satélite –- de la misma forma que las “damas de teléfonos Grameen” en Bangladesh compraban teléfonos celulares para revender el tiempo de llamada?

Hoy, hay algunos puntos de satélite instalados ilegalmente en Cuba. Imaginemos 1000 platos de satélite legales, dispersos por toda la isla, suministrando acceso a internet y a llamadas VOIP (las cuales son ilegales hoy).

Si esta idea se tomara en consideración, imagino que ETECSA querría poseer las estaciones terrestres y establecer los precios. Eso garantizaría las ganancias y el control gubernamental sobre el acceso a Internet, pero sería una estrategia de corta visión. Permitir a los operadores de satélites ser propietarios de su equipamiento, crearía un grupo descentralizado, auto-controlado, de empresarios que aportarían esfuerzo e innovaciones al proyecto.

La situación en Cuba hoy es un recuerdo de lo que era Internet al final de los años 1980 en E.U. Se inventó TCP/IP y mostraba ser efectivo en las redes APRANet y CSNET. El potencial de la red era obvio para aquellos que la habían utilizado, pero el acceso estaba restringido a unas pocas organizaciones y personas.

En aras de conectar a más personas, la Fundación Nacional de Ciencia (National Science Fundation) estableció NSFNet. Ellos contrataron una infraestructura de conexión nacional (blackbone network), y ofrecieron fondos a todos los colegas y universidades para cubrir los costos de un enrutador (router) y de la conexión a la infraestructura nacional. También ofrecieron conexión a redes de educación e investigación en países en desarrollo. Cuando fue desactivado en Abril de 1995, NSFNet era la infraestructura de conexión global, enlazando 28 470 redes domésticas y 22 296 foráneas. (Nótese que Spring, el proveedor de conectividad para naciones en desarrollo, también suministraba conectividad a Cuba, a pesar del embargo)

El proyecto NSFNet en su totalidad costó al contribuyente de E.U $94.5 millones – una inversión pequeña con un retorno inestimable. Cubrir a Cuba con una sábana da platos satelitales tendría resultados similares.

La inversión de NSFNet fue altamente balanceada. Mientras que las universidades obtenían conexión gratuita a la red nacional, se esperaba que ofrecieran acceso para las facultades y los estudiantes. Colectivamente, las universidades invirtieron mucho más en las redes locales de sus campus, en entrenamiento y en personal, que lo que invirtió NSF en NSFNet. El enfoque descentralizado y la arquitectura "end-end" de la red empujaron tanto la formación de capitales como innovaciones a el borde de la red donde hubieron inversionistas y empresarios listo para participar.

¿Cuál sería el rol del gobierno Cubano en un mundo de acceso satelital descentralizado? Su tarea más importante sería la planificación de la capacidad y la negociación con las compañías suministradoras de comunicación por satélite para el ancho de banda. Ellos tendrían además que especificar, evaluar y comprar equipamiento para estaciones terrestres (algunas de los cuales podrían fabricarse en la isla).

Ellos deberían también tomar la delantera en el desarrollo de software que opere eficientemente cuando no hay conexión, usando compresión automática de datos y trasfiriendo los mismos cuando el usuario se conecte. Este tipo de software sería útil en cualquier país con ancho de banda limitado, no solo en Cuba. Dado que la necesidad es la madre de la invención, podríamos incluso llegar a ver soluciones novedosas para ejecutivos ocupados viajando en “modo avión”.

El gobierno debería también apoyar a los operadores de satélite ofreciéndoles préstamos bancarios que ayuden con el costo inicial del equipamiento, facilitando entrenamiento y compartiendo experiencia y “mejores prácticas”. Uno puede imaginarse un banco de micro-finanzas controlado por el gobierno que ofrezca préstamos, y el gobierno pagando los costos de operación de una asociación de operadores de satélite. Como sucedió con NSFNet, el gobierno podría irse alejando de estas actividades una vez que la red sea estable y auto-sostenida.

Por supuesto el sistema de satélites es solo un paso intermedio, a largo plazo será desplazado en favor de una infraestructura de fibra óptica moderna. El sistema de satélites pavimentaría el camino hacia ese objetivo, al crear demanda y habilidades en los usuarios. Los enlaces de satélite servirían de guía al gobierno sobre como asignar sus escasos recursos de fibra óptica -regiones de alta demanda se conectarían primero que las demás-. (Google siguió una estrategia similar al priorizar barrios cuando instalaron su red Giga-bit en la ciudad de Kansas, - áreas con muchos suscriptores fueron las primeras en conectarse-).

Nótese que he sugerido que el gobierno sea responsable por la infraestructura de fibra óptica, pero no por proveer el servicio de internet. Deberían ver la infraestructura de conexión como si fueran carreteras – proveer una infraestructura para ser usada por tractores, autobuses y autos que tienen propietarios independientes. China siguió una estrategia de lanzamiento de internet similar, con organizaciones del gobierno construyendo las infraestructuras de red que para finales de 1999 estaban siendo usadas por más de 500 proveedores de servicio de internet.

Recordemos que las universidades de NSFNet aportaron sus propias redes locales. Uno puede entonces imaginarse redes locales a nivel de ciudad o de pueblos, enlazando estaciones terrestres en la ciudad. Como en el caso de NSF, el diseño y la inversión en tales redes deberían ser locales. En este caso, viene a mi recuerdo las redes de distribución de TV “hechas en casa”, en las que la gente usa su propio cable coaxial para conectar casas y otros locales a una estación central terrestre.

Al inicio de esta publicación, expuse una lista de barreras en el camino a la conectividad en Cuba. He presentado una propuesta de arrancada de bajo costo para una conectividad que no requiere inversión extranjera.

Esto deja entonces las barreras políticas. Tal vez hay esperanza. Como se menciona antes, E.U ha manifestado un deseo de cambio de política y Raúl Castro a llamado a los cubanos a adoptar las reformas económicas “sin prisa, pero sin pausa.”

Un estímulo más específico viene del primer Vice-Presidente Miguel Díaz-Canel, quien dijo: "Hoy, con el desarrollo de las tecnologías de la información, de las redes sociales, de la informática y la Internet, prohibir algo es casi una quimera imposible. No tiene sentido. (...) Por tanto, nosotros constantemente tenemos que estar dialogando."

Reconozco la ironía de proponer que el gobierno adopte una tecnología que llevó al encarcelamiento de Alan Gross y otros. Revertir la legislación sobre comunicación satelital requeriría coraje político, pero también brindaría al gobierno un argumento poderoso contra las acusaciones que pesan sobre él y estarían persiguiendo una solución cubana , una en la que Internet es operado como un servicio al pueblo y la sociedad, no al gobierno o a compañías de telecomunicaciones.

Traducción de un amigo de la Internet cubana.
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Actualización
1/10/2014

Una persona que respondió a mi post menciono que no es necesario que la política de los EE UU cambia para este propuesta tenga éxito. Afirma que en Abril 2009 el gobierno Americano aprobó la venta de satélites para servicios Internet.

Revise lo que la administración en "Reaching out to the Cuban People" especificaba y aprendí que autorizaba cable de fibra óptica y satélites de comunicación que conectaban Cuba con EE UU -- explícitamente para radio y televisión, pero no mencionaba la Internet.

Le pregunté al Departamento del Tesoro, si un proveedor de Internet por satélite podría obtener una licencia para servir a una cuenta de Cuba. Me contestaron que tendrían que revisar para darme una respuesta.
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Actualización
1/18/2014

Satélite ISP IPSTAR dice que han conectado más de 26.000 escuelas en Tailandia, lo que permite a más de 2.000.000 estudiantes el acceso a los materiales de aprendizaje en línea y aplicaciones basadas en IP. Se conectan a las LAN en las escuelas y el aprendizaje "cafés" y se centran en la entrega de matrial enseñanza. Este programa parece ser relativamente centralizado y muy específicas, sino que es un ejemplo de un proyecto de conectividad por satélite patrocinado por el gobierno.

Aquí está un breve vídeo IPSTAR en la educación y otras aplicaciones:

A Cuban approach to achieving Internet connectivity

(Spanish version)

Cuba's domestic Internet infrastructure is one of the worst in the world and the prospects for improvement are dim because of the U. S. embargo, a Cuban government policy of access control and scarcity, ETECSA's power, the lack of a trained, demanding technician and user base and a lack of capital. Can these obstacles be eliminated?

The embargo will eventually be dropped, and there are signs that that may be relatively soon. In the interim, China and others are willing to sell to and trade with Cuba.

Governmental control policy can change. When Cuba first joined the Interent, there was high level debate over the dictator's dilemma -- the perceived political and cultural threat of the Internet versus its value in improving people's lives and the economy. The decision was made to control the Internet and access to it, but that is not set in stone -- it can be reversed.

How about ETECSA? Is there any nation in which the incumbent telecommunication provider -- whether government owned or privately held -- has not acted in its self interest to the detriment of the people and economy? I suspect the answer to that question is "no." I have no knowledge of the current management of ETECSA, but I would be surprised if they were different than others.

ETECSA is jointly owned by the Ministry of Information and Communication and RAFIN, SA. The Ministry is of course part of the government and subject to political will -- policies and leaders can change.

RAFIN is a different matter. I don't know what their role is in the management of ETECSA. I don't even understand what the role of an "SA" is in a socialist nation. Where did they get the capital to purchase Telecom Italia's share of ETECSA? Who are the shareholders and investors? Do they share ETECSA profits and losses? Do they have a "seat on the board" -- a voice in picking executives and making policy decisions? I need the help of an economist here.

A trained, demanding technician and user base will come after connectivity becomes useful, widely available and affordable -- it will follow, not lead the path to a modern Internet.

That leaves the lack of capital. The Chinese took an active role in the financing and installation of the ALBA-1 undersea cable, and we speculated that they might also invest in complementary domestic infrastructure, but that has not happened.

The conventional wisdom from the World Bank or International Telecommunication Union is that the way to raise capital for connectivity is to privatize the telecommunication/ISP industry, and invite foreign investors to build infrastructure and compete on a level playing field watched over by a regulating agency -- privatization, regulation and competition (PCR).

Raúl Castro announced that they are working on a new foreign investment policy, which is of "singular importance to stimulate economic and social development of the country." The law is expected to be approved next March. It remains to be seen whether the new law and perceived demand would attract major investors, but even if they would, there is a problem with the PCR strategy -- it does not work well.

Many developing nations opted for PCR between 1991 and 2008:

In 2009 I looked at the data and concluded that "PCR has had little impact on the Internet during the last ten years in developed or developing nations." I have not updated that paper with subsequent data, but our experience in the US shows that private ownership of telecommunication service providers does not guarantee competition, efficiency and good service in spite of the good intentions of the regulators and congress.

We need a Cuban solution.

It would be great if Cuba could afford modern telecommunication infrastructure, with fiber to premises and backhaul for LTE mobile communications, but it cannot, so we need to think about cheaper interim approaches. The remainder of this post will speculate on one possibility -- a decentralized, multi-satellite policy.

Several years ago, I wrote a couple of articles (here and here) surveying wireless technologies for connectivity in developing nations -- tethered and untethered high-altitude platforms (HAPs), terrestrial wireless (WiMAX was a hope at the time), low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations and very small aperture satellite terminals (VSATs).

Google is experimenting with HAPs, but there are no meaningful deployments. As far as I know, no one is studying LEO satellites and WiMAX has not developed as envisioned. At the time of those earlier articles, VSAT was the only option for connecting rural areas in nations like India, but VSAT ground stations were large, expensive and slow.

Since that time, technology has progressed and the consumer market for satellite connectivity has grown. U. S. providers HughesNet and Viasat have 1,398,000 subscribers between them. In spite of long latency times, I have had smooth video conversations with friends using home satellite dishes in rural Brazil and Chile. The antennae are small, costs are down and speeds are up.

What if Cuba were to encourage the use of these dishes rather than ban them?

Cuba has said they will authorize agents to sell telephone and Internet time. What if they were to expand the program to allow those agents to own and sell time and services using satellite Internet links, in the same way Grameen Phone ladies in Bangladesh bought mobile phones to resell call time.

Today, there are a few illegal satellite installations in Cuba. Imagine 1,000 legal satellite dishes dispersed throughout the island providing Internet access and VOIP calls (which are illegal today).

If that were to be considered, I imagine ETECSA would want to own the ground stations and set prices. That would insure profits and government control over Internet access, but it would be short sighted. Allowing the satellite operators to own their own equipment, would create a decentralized, self-organizing group of entrepreneurs who would bring effort and innovation to the project.

The situation in Cuba today is reminiscent of the Internet in the late 1980s in the U. S. TCP/IP had been invented and shown to be effective in the APRANet and CSNET. The potential of the network was obvious to those who had used it, but access was restricted to a few organizations and people.

In order to bring others online, The National Science Foundation established NSFNet. They contracted for a national backbone network and offered all U. S. colleges and universities grants to cover the cost of a router and a connection to the backbone. They also offered connectivity to education and research networks in developing nations. When it was decommissioned in April 1995, NSFNet was the global backbone, linking 28,470 domestic and 22,296 foreign networks. (Note that Sprint, the developing nations connectivity provider, also provided connectivity to Cuba in spite of the embargo).

The entire NSFNET project cost the U. S. taxpayer $94.5 million -- a small investment with an inestimable return. Blanketing Cuba with small satellite dishes would have similar results.

The NSFnet investment was highly leveraged. While universities got free connections to the backbone, they were expected to provide access for faculty and students. Collectively, universities invested much more in their campus local area networks, training and staff than NSF did in NSFnet. The decentralized approach and the end-end network architecture pushed both capital formation and innovation to the edge of the network where there were eager investors and entrepreneurs.

What would be the role of the Cuban government in a decentralized satellite access world? Their most important task would be capacity planning and negotiating with satellite communication companies for bandwidth. They would also specify, evaluate and purchase ground station equipment (some of which could be manufactured on the island).

They should also take the lead in developing software for efficient offline operation with automatic compression and data transfer when the user goes online. That software would be useful in any limited bandwidth nation, not only Cuba. Necessity being the mother of invention, we might even see some novel solutions for busy executives travelling in "airplane mode."

The government should also support the satellite operators by offering loans to help with initial equipment costs and by facilitating training and the sharing of experience and best practices. One can imagine a government run micro-finance bank offering loans and the government paying the overhead costs for a satellite operator's association. As was the case with NSFNet, the government could phase out of some of this activity once the network was stable and self-sustaining.

Of course the satellite system is an interim step -- in the long run, it will be phased out in favor of modern fiber infrastructure. The satellite system would pave the way to that goal by building user skill and demand. The satellite links would also guide the government in allocating scarce fiber resources -- high demand areas would be connected before others. (Google followed a similar strategy in prioritizing neighborhoods when rolling out their gigabit network in Kansas City -- areas with many committed subscribers were the first to be connected).

Note that I have suggested the government be responsible for a fiber backbone, but not for providing Internet service. They should view the backbone as they view highways -- providing infrastructure for use by independently owned trucks, buses and cars. China followed a similar Internet rollout strategy, with government organizations building backbone networks that, by the end 1999, were being used by over 500 Internet service providers.

Recall that the NSFNet universities provided their own local area networks. One can also imagine pueblo or ciudad-area networks linking the ground stations in a town. As with NSF, the design and investment in any such networks should be local. In this case, I am reminded of the home-made TV distribution networks, in which people would install their own coaxial cable to connect homes and other locations to a central ground station.

At the start of this post, I listed hurdles along the road to Cuban connectivity. I have outlined a low-cost, bootstrap proposal for connectivity that does not require foreign investment.

That leaves the political hurdles. Maybe there is hope. As noted above, the U. S. has signaled a desire for political change and Raúl Castro has admonished Cubans to embrace economic reforms "without haste, but without pause."

More specific encouragement comes from First Vice-President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who has stated that "Today, with the development of information technologies, of social networks, of computing and the Internet, prohibiting something is almost a chimera, impossible ... makes no sense ... We must constantly be in dialogue."

I recognize the irony in proposing that the government embrace a technology that led to the imprisonment of Alan Gross and others. Reversing the law on satellite communication would require political courage, but it would also provide the government a powerful argument against the charges leveled against them and they would be pursuing a Cuban solution -- one in which the Internet is operated as a service to the people and society, not the government or telecommunication companies.
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Update 1/5/2014

A person commenting on this post argued that U. S. policy would not have to be changed for this proposal to succeed -- he suggested that the policy changes announced by the administration in April 2009 cleared the way for sales of satellite Internet service.

The administration fact sheet on Reaching out to the Cuban People authorizes fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba. It goes on to explicitly allow satellite radio and television service, but does not mention Internet service.

I sent an inquiry to the Treasury Department asking if a satellite Internet provider would be able to get a license to serve a Cuban account. A spokesman replied that he would find out and let me know.
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Update 1/17/2014

Satellite ISP IPSTAR says they have connected over 26,000 schools in Thailand, allowing more than 2,000,000 students access to online learning materials and IP-based applications. They downlink to LANs in schools and learning "cafes" and focus on delivering teaching matrial. This program appears to be relatively centralized and narrowly focused, but it is an example of a government sponsored satellite connectivity project.

Here is a short IPSTAR video on education and other applications:


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Update 2/10/2014

As noted above, there are political obstacles to this proposal in both Cuba and the U. S. I asked the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U. S. Treasury Department, which oversees our Cuba trade policy, about this proposal.

OFAC's Cuban Assets Control Regulations policy regarding the Internet is as follows:

§515.578 Exportation of certain services incident to Internet-based communications.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the exportation from the United States or by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to persons in Cuba of services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging, is authorized, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user.

(b) This section does not authorize:

(1) The direct or indirect exportation of services with knowledge or reason to know that such services are intended for a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba, as defined in §515.337 of this part, or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, as defined in §515.338 of this part.

(2) The direct or indirect exportation of Internet connectivity services or telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite links or dedicated lines).

Note to §515.578(b)(2): For general licenses related to the provision of telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba and contracts for telecommunications services provided to particular individuals in Cuba, see §515.542(b) and §515.542(c), respectively, of this part. For a general license and a statement of specific licensing policy related to the establishment of telecommunications facilities linking the United States or third countries and Cuba, see §515.542(d) of this part.

(3) The direct or indirect exportation of web-hosting services that are for purposes other than personal communications (e.g., web-hosting services for commercial endeavors) or of domain name registration services.

(4) The direct or indirect exportation of any items to Cuba.

Note to §515.578(b)(4): For the rules related to transactions ordinarily incident to the exportation or reexportation of items, including software, to Cuba, see §§515.533 and 515.559 of this part.

(c) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for the exportation of other services incident to the sharing of information over the Internet.

The policy disallows satellite Internet connectivity services, which I have proposed here, but it does allow for specific licences on a case by case basis. When I asked about that, a spokesperson stated "Off the record, I just don't think our licensing policy has extended that far."

I checked with a second expert, anonymous source who disagreed, stating that a license probably would be granted and that an explicit change in policy was in fact under consideration.

He also pointed out that the biggest sticking point might be the issue of garnishment/attachment -- U. S. companies are afraid that by entering into business with Cuba/ETECSA, they would open themselves to lawsuits in the U. S. by Cuban-Americans trying to recuperate damages for expropriations by the Cuban government. This roadblock might require Congressional legislation to “protect” U. S. companies from such suits.

The bottom line from the U. S. side seems to be that there are obstacles, but there seems to be a desire to overcome them -- that would leave the ball in the Cuban government's court.

Ilegal satellite Internet service in Cuba

Alan Gross is in prison for bringing personal satellite equipment into Cuba and a plot to smuggle dishes in disquised as surfing equipment was foiled, but it seems that a clandestine business operating out of Miami has succeded where they failed.

According to articles in the Miami Herald and El Nuevo Herald, the anonymous businessman has sold at least 35 personal satellite systems in Cuba -- for Internet access and low-cost international calls.

The anonymous business man runs a Web page which redirects to a video showing images of dishes, which are presumably in Cuba:

The video, which was uploaded on July 26, 2009 has the following description:

SI NECESITA SERVICIO DE INTERNET EN CUBA LE PODEMOS AYUDAR CON NUESTRA EXPERIENCIA, ALTA VELOCIDAD AL ALCANCE DE SU FAMILIAR, FUNCIONA PARA TODO LLAMADAS VOIP, DESCARGAS, CAMARA, VARIAS PC CONECTADAS,SOMOS LA UNICA ENTIDAD CON EXPERIENCIA PROBADA PARA HACER ESTO EN CUBA, EL SISTEMA INSTALADO ALLA CUESTA 3500$ PAGOS ANTES DE ENVIARLO, PARA MAS INFO 7864431240.

The articles also quote Ricardo Arevalo, general manager of Exede, a company that leases satellite internet equipment, as saying the "number of such systems in Cuba is closer to 300."

These systems are not cheap by Cuban standards -- getting the equipment in and installed costs between $3,500-$4.200, paid in advance in Miami. The bills are generally paid for by families members who live in the US and it seems that the motivation is purely business -- cheap phone calls and Internet access -- not political.

These reports leave me a bit skeptical -- it seems it would be too easy to entrap customers -- but, if these reports are for real, Alan Gross and USAID could have saved a lot of the taxpayer's money and Gross could be a free man.

The US and Cuba both overestimate the impact of small Internet ground stations

The Alan Gross case has been in the news, but Phil Peters just posted a description of an earlier attempt to smuggle satellite Internet ground stations on his blog the Cuban Triangle. The ground stations were the type used by people in rural areas who cannot get cable or DSL connections, and the antennae were disguised as surf boards. Gross summarizes the failed attempt and links to a Spanish language post with several photos of the equipment and a Cuban TV program on the project.

Let's put these smuggling attempts in context. In my recent report on the state of the Internet in Cuba, I observed that there were reportedly over 300,000 mobile phones (2008) and 455,000 Internet-connected computers (2009) in Cuba.

How many cell phones, laptops or ground stations could Gross or his predecessors have brought in without attracting attention? Had these efforts succeeded, they would have had a negligible marginal impact -- they would have been minuscule drops in the bucket. Both the US and Cuba appear to have grossly overestimated the possible impact of this equipment.

As I have shown in an earlier post, low-speed satellite ground stations are quite limited, but the Cuban government has reported that they represent a serious threat. In doing so, they have scored a public relations victory -- showing Cuban citizens that they have defended them against a "major" cyber attack.

The US also overestimates the value of personal Internet ground stations. The State Department budget request for Cuba is $20 million for fiscal year 2011. Those funds will be used to

continue to promote self-determined democracy in Cuba. Funds will be used to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners, their families, and other victims of repression; advance human rights; strengthen independent civil society organizations; and support information sharing into and out of Cuba.

I don't know what percent of their budget goes toward the "support of information sharing" using Internet ground stations, but it would have to cover the cost of the equipment, travel and expenses, bandwidth charges, overhead charges, etc. On top of these financial costs, there is the possibility of failure and the subsequent PR cost. It is hard to know what they hoped to achieve in these cases, and easy to think of alternative ways to use the funds.

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I got the Cuba budget figure for the State Department here.

The clandestine TV reception discussed in the comments of this post seem much more important than a few Internet links. How many Cubans see foreign TV? What do Cubans watch? How does it influence them?

What did Alan Gross actually do?

Alan Gross and his wife Judy

The trial of Alan Gross, who was arrested in December 2009, has begun in Havana. Gross is accused of working on a USAID contract to bring illegal equipment into Cuba for distribution to NGOs.

I can readily believe that USAID might have commissioned such a project -- they are pretty open about their goals and funding programs -- but I can't get a fix on exactly what Gross allegedly brought in. I've read cryptic statements saying he brought:

• Sophisticated satellite communications equipment, Raúl Castro quoted in the Washington post
  
• Cell phones, laptops and other communications equipment, Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, NY Times
  
• BGAN Satellite ground stations, Elsa Claro, El Progresso

The court proceedings are closed to the public and press, but let's assume he brought it all -- cell phones, laptops, and BGAN ground stations, and that he was doing so on a USAID contract. How much damage could he have done?

Cell phones and laptops are increasingly available in Cuba, so those he might have brought would not have made a significant difference.

What about BGAN ground stations, which can be used for clandestine Internet connectivity? I discussed the limited capability of BGAN equipment in a previous post -- a few BGAN ground stations would have no practical impact. (Elsa Claro speculated that they could be used for encrypted messages perhaps containing bombing coordinates, but so could any other IP-connected computer in Cuba -- see, for example, this post).

Without taking a position on the right or of the US and USAID to meddle in Cuban affairs, the efficacy of that meddling or Alan Gross' motives, it seems clear that what he allegedly tried to do would not have made a difference even if he had succeeded.

Is this man a specialist in cybernetic counterintelligence?

Eduardo Fontes Suárez

A 53 minute video of Eduardo Fontes Suárez giving a presentation on the US attempts at cyber war against Cuba was recently leaked and put online. I won't say more about that because you can read an excellent discussion of its content and likely authenticity here. You can also read a transcript in English or in Spanish.

I will focus on the part of the talk during which Fontes Suárez, who is a "specialist in cybernetic counterintelligence," describes a plot by the US to smuggle ten BGAN satellite terminals into Cuba on order to provide unfettered Internet access by NGOs, bloggers and others.

Fontes Suárez seems to have little knowledge of the technology he is describing, which leads him to grossly overstate its capability.

Fontes Suárez says there are "10 BGAN terminals in different parts of the country" and "These ten terminals are around wireless networks which already existed".  Wow -- ten pre-existing wireless networks with unfettered Internet access sounds like it might be a big deal, but let's look further.

How big are these ten wireless networks? The fastest BGAN terminal is capable of "up to" 492 kbps and subject to the usual high latency of a satellite link. So these "wireless networks" are actually just WiFi hot spots with users sharing a slow, high-latency connection. One user may be able to watch a Netflix video or carry on a VoIP conversation, but if there were, say three or four, they would be restricted to very slow Web surfing or text applications.

Fontes Suárez also refers to people sitting at home and seeing a message pop up that says "you're connected to the Internet." He envisions them as pleasantly surprised and happily "logging on" and starting to search, surf and download. Given this description, I get the feeling that he has never used WiFi.

He goes on to talk about connecting 25-30 machines using WiFi. For a start, 492 kbps/25 = 20 kbps. Web sites are unusable at that speed. He goes on to say the 25-30 machines can be spread out over a half mile to a mile. WiFi is designed for small, local area networks. A WiFi link connecting only one user who was half a mile away would take large antennas with line of sight visibility. Even if the 25 machines were in the same room as the access point, the contention for the limited number of WiFi channels and the access point protocols would slow them to a crawl.

He says the minimum number of users of a BGAN terminal is five. Is there a minimum? Does the equipment refuse to work if there are only four users? When BGAN speaks of five users, they are all assumed to be in the same room as or very close to the base station. If there were five users, remember that they would be sharing a high-latency link of "up to" 492 kbps.

Fontes Suárez also asserts that "in Havana there are thousands of wireless computers connected in any neighborhood, from Playa to San Miguel del Padron" and that kids are using them to play games and university students are using them to study collaboratively. Ten BGAN links in different parts of the country would not be of much use to these "thousands" of computers.

I do not know how widespread WiFi is in Havana or elsewhere in Cuba, but I am skeptical of this image of somewhat ubiquitous WiFi in homes and university dorms. I do know that computer ownership and Internet connection rates are low in Cuba. I also know that there would be little reason to have a WiFi access point that was connected to the Internet via a dial-up line.

It also seems that one must register a WiFi LAN. At the MIC Web site, under the heading "Wireless Networks," we see that registration is required:

Los equipos y dispositivos auxiliares que componen estos sistemas están sujetos a la obtención de un certificado de homologación otorgado por el Ministerio de la Informática y las Comunicaciones (MIC), y podrán ser sometidos a los procedimientos de medición y comprobación de sus parámetros por los laboratorios que designe ese ministerio.

The application form is here. (Note that it describes the radios as spread spectrum in frequency band 2456 to 2482 MHz. The frequency is not exactly WiFi -- this may be a typo or indicate some non-standard technology). Does anyone know whether this registration requirement is actually enforced?

Finally, Fontes Suárez claims that BGAN terminals use "linear transmission," which he claims is difficult to detect and it surely sounds nefarious, but what does that piece of snow/jargon mean?

Some have questioned the authenticity of this leak - it may be a plant. One never knows, but it is hard for me to believe that Fontes Suárez is a specialist in cybernetic counterintelligence.